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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAN

C . WORRALL ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

OGDEN CITY FIRE
DEPARTMENT & OGDEN
CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No 16375
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Defendants/Respondents. )

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents take issue with the following facts as stated
by appellant.
Fact as stated by appellant:
Evidence was further produced by other firemen indicating
that there were no health or safety problems with the wearing of
a mustache, (T-24,T-33), although some individuals felt there could
be a problem with the sealing of face masks in fighting a fire
with certain facial hair, and that was the reason for the promulgation
of the rule (T-33).
Chief Hansen testified that the extreme heat or exposure to
a flash fire can burn exposed skin, hair or the like causing injury
(T-45-46). He also testified that through his research he found that
beards and sideburns can cause the protective oxygen mask not to
seal properly.

(T-45).
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The Assistant Chief Hilton testified that masks cannot se
properly when hair gets in the way as seepage will occur. (T-53)
He further testified that hair burns and that was a facto:
they considred in adopting General Order 160.

(T-53).

Fact as stated by appellant:
Evidence was also adduced that indicated that other individuals were also in violation of Rule 160, but were not discipl:
as was the appellant.

(T-10-T-27-T-33).

Fact as stated by respondent:
Chief Hansen testified as follows:

Q.

Now, after you issued Order No. 160, did you have a

conversation with the plaintiff, Mr. Dan Worrall, concerning the
order, Chief Hansen:
A.

Yes, Mr. Worrall was accosted in the outer office or

hallway the day that he came onto the shift.

He stated or demandl

did I, in fact, intend to enforce this order.

Q.

What was your response:

A.

I said, "Dan yes, I do.

I intend to enforce any ore!

that I issue in regard to this Fire Department."

And he stated,

"well, I intend to fight you because I have no intentions of cutt,
off this mustache."

Q.

Okay.

A. "

What occurred after that confrontation?
at that particular time no action was taken.

I discussed it with his supervisor which was mentioned before
Lawrence Todd.

We talked about it again.

later that oay or the next shift.

I had Dan into my off:

I am not really sure now.
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We

talked about it and discussed the matter, and he said he wanted to
think about it a little more at that time, and we did.
thereafter, there was no compliance again to the order.

Shortly
I directed

a letter to the city manager and to all concerned at the particular

time that Mr. Worrall be suspended, only that suspension be not in
effect and in fact enforced, that I give him some time to think about
it, that we wanted to work on it.

Like I say, I don't take no

exception with Danny's work ability and that.

I give him every

opportunity possible to comply with the order, and each step no
compliance was felt.

"

Q.

What was the reason why he was terminated, then?

A.

He was terminated for failure to compliance--for

compliance with this order which is correctly called insubordination,
whatever the fact that he did not comply.
And he did not.

He refused to comply.

(T-46-47)
. What is the procrdure the Fire Department goes

Q.

through to bring people into conformity with Order No. 160?
A.

. As has been brought out in here before, people have

been approached and told that they should straighten up, they
should cut mustaches, and in most cases that is all it takes to
do it.

They have shaving facilities, bathroom facilities, and the

like, and in general, it is just taken care of immediately, right
then, without any quibbling or the like.
Q.

Now, do you know of any other individuals besides Mr.

Worrall that have not, when requested to get a haircut or trim a
mustache or a beard--or not beard, but sideburns, that have not
done

it? (T-48)
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A.

No.

I do not know.

they have complied.

They have been requested and

(T-48)
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD
NOT PROPERLY APPEALED TO THE OGDEN CITY CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE TIME
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
WAS CORRECT.
Appellant cites Vetterli vs. Civil Service Commission of
Salt Lake City, 145 P.2d 792 (Utah) (1946) as authority for his
position that the Civil Service Commission may review an appeal
that is not filed within five (5) days.

The Court in Vetterli,

however, declined to discuss the issue that his appeal was not f:1
in time.

The language from Vetterli reads as follows:
"Owing to the fact that the Chief of Police
and the Civil Service Commission desire to have
the statute involved in this case construed by
the Court and in view of the conclusion reached
as to its meaning, we shall not discuss either
(a) the proposition that the appeal was not in
time. . . . " (Emphasis added) See 145 P. 2d at 794
Vetterli is not authority for the position that the Civ

Service Commission may review appeals untimely filed.
The reason Vetterli came before the Supreme Court is bee!
all parties involved "desired to have the statute involved int'
case construed by this court."

See 145 P.2d at 794

Plaintiff is correct that an objection was made by the·
chief that Vetterli' s appeal had not been perfected within the .I
allowed by law and that the commission overruled that objectior,
and heard the matter.

However, we do know upon what facts the

Civil Service Commission overruled the police chief, it could"
been the same reason the Supreme Court gave in declining to
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ru.

on the five day appeal period; that is the importance of determining
the scope of Civil Service Corrrrnission authority.
We agree that the notices appellant received did not tell
him that he had five days to appeal.

However, we do not agree

that some vague reference was made during the course of the trial,
that the five day appeal provision is contained within a handbook
of rules and regulations passed out to all employees by the
department.

The appellant was given, as is all employees, a

handbook that specifically explains the procedure and time limits
involved when appealing termination.
specific.

It is not vague, but is

Also, Section 10-10-21 Utah Code Annotated (1953)

spells out the time limits to file an appeal.
Appellant's argument is:

I was not aware of the time period

to file an appeal, therefore, do not penalize me for not filing
within the required time.

Appellant is not trying to justify the

tardy appeal on any other grounds.

There is little question that

he should have known the time period to file an appeal.

The law

charges everyone with a knowledge of published statutes, and because
this information was available, and in fact the appellant should have
known the time requirements, this Court should not allow his ignorance
to allow him a hearing before the Industrial Collllllission.
I agree with appellant's analysis of Entre Nous Club
v. Toronto, 287 P.2d 670 (1955), that appellant is entitled to a
reasonable time and place for hearing where interested parties may
attend with reasonable effort; . . . reasonable notice to interested
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parties . . . ; and a reasonable opportunity for presentation
of such evidence and argument as are appropriate to the proceea,:
However, the notice the Court is referring to is the Mt

-.:.

of the hearing, not notice that the appellant should be notifiec
of the time limit in which to file an appeal.
The facts of Toronto are the Secretary of State was sue(
Entre Nous Club to restrain the Secretary of State from revokini
their charter.
The Secretary of State was proceeding to revoke their
charter pursuant to a statute that authorized the Secretary of
State, after a hearing, to revoke the charter of any non-profit,
club if it was actually organized for pecuniary profit, or is
used for gambling or other unlawful purposes.
The Secretary of State had given notice of the hearing,
but the notice as issued was not notice "which we could general:
characterize as reasonably calculated to give actual notice"
and was not given to the club as required by the statute.
As the Court can plainly determine, the facts

of~

are not even similar to the facts before this Court, and the

nq

requirement that is spoke of is the notice involved in notifyir.:
the corporation of the hearing for revocation, not the time in
which to file an appeal.

Due process of law does not require t'

City to notify the appellant of the time period in which to fii
an appeal contesting termination.

I agree, due process would

require the City to notify the appellant of any hearings that c,
with his termination.
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I agree with appellant that there are administrative
agencies that send notice of the time period in which to appeal;
however, it is not a procedure mandatory by law.

In this type

case it is not mandatory that the city notify the appellant that he
has five days to appeal upon termination.

As stated previously,

appellant was notified of his right to appeal by receiving a copy
of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations when he commenced his
employment.

Also, not only appellant but every civil service employee

is put on notice of their right to appeal by Section 10-10-21
Utah Code Annotated (1953).

There is no legal duty for the City

to notify the appellant of the time to appeal upon termination.
Respondents agree with appellant's interpretation of Rose
Marie Hurne v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, No. 15634, filed
January 10,1979, in that the appeal period runs from notice of
judgment.

Applying the facts of Rose Marie Hurne to the facts of

this case, appellant should have been notified that he was terminated,
and there is little question he was notified of the fact.

Rose

Marie Hurne is not authority for appellant's position that the City
must notify the appellant of the appeal period.
Respondents did try to use the five day appeal period
in their motion for sununary judgment to prevent the Court from
hearing the case on its merits.

However, the trial court ruled

that respondents' motion was not timely filed and proceeded to the
merits of the case.

As respondents read the Order and Judgment,

the Court is saying "if the motion for sununary judgment was timely
filed, the Court would have ruled the appellant had not exhausted
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his administrative remedies and granted the motion; however,
because it was not timely filed the Court heard the facts and
held the facts were not sufficient to carry appellant's burden::
proof.
As this Court can plainly determine, there was not any
evidence presented that would demonstrate Order No. 160 had no
rational,

reasonable relationship to a bona fide public purp 05 ,

The district court was correct in ruling that there was not caus,
of action against the City.
Appellant had an effective review of the merits, by the
district court hearing the case.
POINT II.
GENERAL RULE NO. 160 WAS NOT ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY APPLIED AGAINST THE APPELLANT
DENYING HIM EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Appellant in his complaint alleged that "administering
the regulation in question was a denial of equality of rights <:
was arbitrary and capricious, thereby denying him due process a:
equal protection under the law contrary to the Fourteenth Amend
of the Constitution of the State of Utah.

Appellant's allegatc:

were not that the fire department actions were arbitrary and
capricious against the appellant, but rather General Order No.·
denied appellant Is rights guaranteed by the United States and n
Constitutions.

Appellant tried to receive a new trial on issue·

that were not alleged in his complaint and not properly before·.
Court.

The Court did, however, receive testimony that other

firemen were called in and requested to bring their hair, si~'
and mustaches in conformity with the order and they complied.
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Assistant Chief Hilton testified that to keep grooming standards in
conformity to General Order No.
tPn~

160 is an ongoing process and men

tn let their hair grow beyond the requirements; however, when

requested they get a trim and meet the requirement of the Order.
I agree that the appellant was singled out, but why was he
singled out?

That question is easily answered from the evidence;

the appellant wanted to challenge General Order No. 160.

The

method by which he chose to challenge the order was by non-compliance.
There can be no arbitrary and capricious application of Order 160
when the appellant is given the same opportunity as the other
firemen but he refuses to comply.

The record is repleat, and there

is a specific finding that appellant realized his mustache did not
comply and he was officially challenging the validity of the
department's action in issuing Order No. 160.
I

also agree that the appellant was an excellent employee;

but I disagree that he was "made an example."

There is no evidence

to support that allegation; on the contrary, all the evidence
supports the findings of the Court that he was given an opportunity
to comply but refused because "he was challenging the validity
of the Order."

There can be no violation of the equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, under the facts before this
Court.
CONCLUSION
The appellant was notified of his right to appeal his
termination within five (5) days by Section 10-10-21, Utah Code
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L

Annotated (1953).

Also, the Civil Service Rules and Regulations

he received upon being employed by the City notified him of the.
period to appeal termination.
There is no duty on the part of the respondents to noti:
the appellant at

the time of his termination that he has five

G

to appeal said termination.
The appellant challenged the validity of General Order:;
160 by not trirmning his mustache as requested.
chance and lost the challenge.

Appellant tooka

He allowed his personal preferer.

to appearance take precedence over his employment.

There is

nothing wrong with that decision if you are prepared to face th1
consequences.

There is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendmen:

equal protection, under these facts.
The trial court did not make any errors that have
prejudiced the rights of the appellant, and its decision should
be upheld by this Court.
DATED this

~day of August, 1979.
Respectfully submitted

Counsel
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